s.20(1)(b)

Transportation Safety Board of Canada



Bureau de la sécurité des transports du Canada

Place du Centre 200 Promenade du Portage 4th Floor Gatineau, Quebec K1A 1K8

617-01/18 R18W0001

07 March 2018

Ms. Brigitte Diogo (ASR)
Director General, Rail Safety
Transport Canada
14th Floor, Enterprise Building
427 Laurier Avenue
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N5

Dear Ms. Diogo:

SUBJECT: RAIL SAFETY ADVISORY LETTER 01/18
Uncontrolled movement at Mile 75.63 of the Minnedosa Subdivision

On	Canadian Pacific Railway		
(CP) train the CP Minnedos	(the train) was ascending the 1.3% grade between a Subdivision, near Minnedosa, Manitoba.		on
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Train movements are governed by the occupancy control system (OCS), as authorized by the Canadian Rail Operating Rules (CROR) and supervised by a rail traffic controller located in Calgary, Alberta.
At about the locomotive throttle was placed in notch 8. The throttle was maintained in notch 8 until , when it was reduced to notch 5. Almost immediately (1 second later), while the train was travelling at a train-initiated emergency brake application occurred. At the train came to a stop after travelling a total of 264.3 feet.
Inspection of the train by the crew determined that there was a broken knuckle behind the 2nd car from the head-end. The knuckle was changed, the train was re-coupled, and the train air brakes were partially re-charged. However, as the train was still unable to move, the locomotive engineer initiated an emergency brake application to secure the train on the ascending grade. Shortly thereafter, a CP company officer arrived at the site to help resolve the situation, and was in contact with the crew from this time on.
At charging of the train air brakes was re-started. About 3 minutes later, the end of train device displayed a pressure reading of 43 psi. At with the train air brakes only partially charged, the locomotive engineer placed the reverser in the forward position, attempting to move the train again. At the throttle was advanced to notch 6. At (1 second later), with the train still stationary, another train-initiated emergency brake application occurred when the train pulled apart. Ten seconds later, the head-end locomotives came to rest near after travelling 29.6 feet.
The 2nd inspection of the train by the crew confirmed that a broken knuckle had occurred again when the train separated on the
ascending grade.
During the emergency brake applications, no emergency radio broadcasts were made. In addition, after stopping following the emergency brake applications, no retainers or handbrakes were applied to the movement. The crew members believed that, as they were in close proximity to the train, the train was attended, in compliance with CROR Rule 112 (Leaving Equipment Unattended) which governs train securement.
After changing the knuckle on the 3rd locomotive, the locomotive engineer noted that the remainder of the train was starting to roll uncontrolled downhill (i.e., in the reverse direction). While operating the head-end locomotives, the locomotive engineer attempted unsuccessfully to catch up with (and couple onto) the uncontrolled portion of the train. The 112 loaded covered hopper cars and the mid-train locomotive rolled uncontrolled for almost a mile. The uncontrolled movement traversed 2 public crossings:
 a passive crossing protected by standard railway crossing signs (crossbucks); and an automated crossing protected by flashing lights and bells
The uncontrolled movement travelled across the automated crossing at a speed of uncontrolled movement came to a stop on its own, with the tail-end car at in the town of Minnedosa (TSB Occurrence No. R18W0001).

-3-

In this occurrence, a number of operational actions and decisions were not consistent with regulatory requirements and railway standard operating procedures, much of which occurred in the presence of a company officer, including:

- improper train securement;
- despite a requirement to use retainers and/or handbrakes in these situations, no retainers or handbrakes were applied;
- insufficient charge time to allow safe use of the trains air brakes;
- improper use of the throttle;
- excessive tractive effort through the use of excessive driving axles for this location; and
- no emergency radio broadcast was made following the emergency brake applications.

Given the importance of safely operating distributed power trains and properly securing equipment, Transport Canada may wish to review CP's training program to ensure that all operating employees, including company officers, have a clear understanding of the required rules, instructions and procedures (e.g., CROR and company GOI) for these types of operations.

Yours sincerely,

Til Joy

Kirby Jang Director

Investigation Operations Rail/Pipeline

Cc:

Railway Association of Canada

Canadian Pacific Railway

s.20(1)(b)

Transportation Safety Board of Canada



Bureau de la sécurité des transports du Canada

Place du Centre 200 Promenade du Portage 4th Floor Gatineau, Quebec K1A 1K8

624-05/18 SR18-017

22 March 2018

Ms. Brigitte Diogo (ASR)
Director General, Rail Safety
Transport Canada
14th Floor, Enterprise Building
427 Laurier Avenue
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N5

Dear Ms. Diogo:
SUBJECT: RAIL SAFETY INFORMATION LETTER 05/18 Inspection of Trains from one side only at CP's Winnipeg Terminal
The TSB Confidential Transportation Reporting Program, Securitas, received a report alleging that, following crew changes at Canadian Pacific Railway's (CP) terminal in Winnipeg, some trains, have been departing the terminal after having had only one side of the train inspected.
The confidential reporter indicated that on the operating crew of train requested a pull-by inspection prior to departure. However, the operating crew was advised that the train had already been inspected upon arrival on one side, and that this inspection was sufficient. The operating crew was then instructed to depart.
The confidential reporter is concerned that train inspections from one side only may not always be sufficient to identify potential equipment issues and load securement issues on the train.
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This information has been provided to you for whatever follow-up action you deem appropriate.

Yours sincerely,

King Jan

Kirby Jang Director

Investigation Operations Rail/Pipeline

Cc:

Canadian Pacific Railway

Railway Association of Canada